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Suction Dredging in the United States: Current
Regulations and Potential Paths Forward
Colin Arsenault*
Abstract
This note reviews the current regulations that exist to mitigate the
environmental impacts of suction dredge mining both globally and in the United
States. It begins by discussing suction dredging in the realm of cooperative
federalism, and whether California’s moratorium will be upheld if a challenge is
heard in the Supreme Court.1
It then compares the current regulatory structures in four US states. It
contrasts the schemes of Oregon and California, which are run by the states, with
the schemes of Idaho and Alaska, which rely predominantly on the federal
government for enforcement. This section is followed by a discussion of the current
lack of enforcement measures of the EPA and argues that these enforcement
measures are currently better left to the states.
Lastly, the final section discusses schemes that have been developed in
Russia, South Africa, and South America. These countries dredge because of
economic factors associated with livelihood and violence, whereas in the United
States dredging is recreational. This note also briefly analyzes how the Russian,
South African, and South American governments enforce their schemes and why
they are not appropriate in the United States.
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the price of gold has been on an upward trajectory in
the United States.2 With that upward trajectory has come a renewed interest in
Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (“ASM”).3 A particularly popular type of ASM

* Colin Arsenault is a law student at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, class of 2019.
1. People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 820 (Cal. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 635 (2018).
2. Gold Prices–100 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS (Oct. 10, 2018, 9:23 AM),
https://perma.cc/SPD8-2CVB.
3. Molly Dischner, Small-Scale Gold Mining Grows as Prices Remain High, ALASKA
J. OF COM. (Nov. 15, 2012, 7:31 PM), https://perma.cc/736D-J28Z.
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is called placer mining, or suction dredge mining.4 Essentially, suction dredge
mining is a large vacuum that floats on top of the water.5 A hose connected to a
nozzle comes out of the bottom of the machine, where a diver can use it to vacuum
up the sediment from the water’s bed.6 The water and sediment then go through a
sluice box where the gold is trapped while the water and other sediment are flushed
back into the water.7 These machines allow miners to access deposits and areas that
were unavailable to prospectors of the nineteenth century.8 Additionally, because
suction dredges are efficient and relatively inexpensive to purchase, the deposits
do not need to be as rich in gold as they were in the past for miners to make a
profit.9
Unfortunately, research suggests that the unregulated use of suction dredges
can lead to significant environmental harm.10 Suction dredging can interfere with
fish spawning, negatively alter channel topography, and harm sensitive habitats.11
Globally, ASM has resulted in massive destruction of the South American
rainforests, and polluted water sources with dangerous levels of mercury.12 This
practice has also been associated with criminal syndicates, resulting in human
displacement, child labor, and armed conflicts.13
This note seeks to review the current ways governments, both within the
United States and abroad, are tackling the issues associated with suction dredge
mining. It begins by reviewing cooperative federalism in the United States,
followed by looking at the current regulatory practices within the United States—
highlighting the relationship between the states and the federal government. It then
describes the inadequacies of the federal government’s current regulatory
practices, followed by reviewing the systems that have been adopted in Russia,
South Africa, and South America. The note also reviews other countries’
regulatory practices to demonstrate what other methods are available, and why they

4. Steve Hershbach, Steve’s Guide to Suction Gold Dredges, DETECTOR PROSPECTOR
(Oct. 11, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://perma.cc/N3UF-9ARF.
5. Steve Hershbach, Steve’s Guide to Suction Gold Dredges, DETECTOR PROSPECTOR
(Oct. 11, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://perma.cc/N3UF-9ARF.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Dave McCracken, Covering the Basics of Suction Gold Dredging, THE NEW 49ERS
(Mar. 1993), https://perma.cc/78PS-XQZJ.
9. Id.
10. Bret C. Harvey & Thomas E. Lisle, Effects of Suction Dredging on Streams: A
review and an Evaluation Strategy, 23 FISHERIES 8, 9 (1998).
11. Id.
12. J. A., Minecraft - Illegal Mining in Latin America, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 16,
2014), https://perma.cc/2VX9-TEY8.
13. U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Inst. (UNICRI), Rep. on
Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain, at 28, 33 (May
2016).
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are not appropriate in the United States. Ultimately, this piece recommends that
states, such as California and Oregon, should continue developing their own
regulatory schemes and not rely on the federal government for enforcement.

I.

Cooperative Federalism as it Pertains to Environmental
Regulation

Before beginning a review of the current systems in place that regulate
suction dredge mining at the state level, it is prudent to determine if the states have
the power to regulate the act in the first place. Mining interest groups rely on a
strict interpretation of the Mining Act of 1872 (“Act”) to find authority to pursue
their claims.14 The Act itself allows a private citizen to explore potential mining
opportunities on federal land, and allows them to perfect a new mining claim by
properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements.15 Morris
writes, the Act was “part of [a] larger set of land disposal statutes and it was
intended to (and did in fact) encourage settlement and economic activity in the
American West.”16 Before the Act, there was no consistent strategy of licensing
claims on federal land.17 For example, gold was discovered in California shortly
after it became an American territory, when it had no official scheme of regulating
mining claims. The Act was a means of filling the lack of authority for mining
claims in lands that were territories and not yet states.18
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal laws
made in conjunction with one of Congress’ enumerated powers can preempt state
laws.19 The question then becomes whether the Act preempts any state regulation.
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., a mining company
protested the California Coastal Commission’s requirement of a permit on federal
land overseen by the Forest Service.20 The Court held that the Act did not facially
preempt any regulations that may have been imposed by states on federal land
authorized by the Act.21 In its analysis, the Court hypothesized that a state
environmental regulation could become “so severe that a particular land use would
become commercially impracticable.”22 This language seems to suggest that if a

14. Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1–16, 17 Stat. 91, 91–96 (1872) (current version
at 30 U.S.C.S. § 22 et seq. (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115–253, approved 10/3/18)).
15. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 575–76 (1987).
16. Andrew P. Morris et al., Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under
the General Mining Law of 1872, 34 ENVT’L. L. 745, 762 (2004).
17. Id. at 761.
18. Id. at 762.
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 480 U.S. at 575–76.
21. Id. at 582–83.
22. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 480 U.S. at 587.
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regulation was commercially impracticable, the Secretary of the Interior would be
able to modify his land use plans under the public lands land policy and
management statute found in 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).23 The Court concluded by
noting that state law is only preempted when it conflicts with operation or
objectives of federal law, or when Congress gives evidence of intent to occupy the
field.24
In 2009, California placed a moratorium on all suction dredging activities.25
In 2012, Brandon Lance Rinehart was cited for operating a suction dredge on
federal land within California.26 The California Court of Appeal found the
California dredge moratorium to be “commercially impracticable” as suggested in
California Coastal Commission.27 The California Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeal—which held the moratorium would be preempted
if it rendered mining “commercially impracticable”—seeming to ignore the
“commercially impracticable” issue altogether.28 The court relied primarily on the
argument that Congress intended to affirmatively preempt the states from creating
laws that had the effect of regulating mining on federal land.29 The court’s
avoidance of discussing the “commercial impracticability” found in California
Coastal Commission is notable. While the case was denied certiorari, in the future
it will be interesting to see if the Justices decide to define “commercial
impracticability” and what it means for state environmental regulation.
Whatever the court’s reason for not discussing commercial impracticability,
it means that currently in California the moratorium is legal. California and other
states have begun regulating suction dredging. At the time of writing this, there has
been no successful preemption challenge to the regulations.
Another question the Court will have to decide is how far the Tenth
Amendment should be extended when it comes to a state banning an activity that
seems to be implied under a Congressional Act like the Mining Act of 1872. Under
the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”30 Traditionally, conservative members of the Court
have read this amendment to mean that any power not enumerated in the

23. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 480 U.S. at 587.
24. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 480 U.S. at 593–94.
25. See discussion infra Section II.B.
26. People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 820 (Cal. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 138 S.
Ct. 635 (2018).
27. People v. Rinehart, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 562 (Ct. App. 2014).
28. Jonathan Rosenthal, People v. Rinehart: No Preemption of State Environmental
Regulations Under the Mining Act of 1872, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 555, 558–59 (2017).
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Constitution is reserved for state legislatures, giving them more power to regulate
things free from the grasp of the federal government.31
However, there is also a trend among conservative Supreme Court Justices
of writing opinions in favor of industry and expressing skepticism of
environmental regulation.32 The question then becomes, how will the conservative
members of the Supreme Court qualify this disparity? Will they follow their
ideology and reserve the right of states to regulate how they wish, or will they take
a pro industry anti-environmental regulatory view and strike down the California
moratorium as an overreach of the government? Justice Kavanaugh was only
recently appointed, but all signs point to him being on the far right side of the
bench.33 Based on his first term, Justice Gorsuch will follow in Justice Scalia’s
footsteps and be an ideologically conservative Justice, leaving the Court in a
similar ideological distribution.34 If the question is eventually heard, it will be
interesting to see the Court’s reasoning for upholding or dismantling a moratorium
like the one in California.

II. Current Regulations and Penalties in the United States:
California, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska
A.

Introduction

In the United States, suction dredging is regulated both federally and
locally.35 This section reviews the regulatory systems used in four states where
suction dredging has been a point of contention: California, Oregon, Idaho, and
Alaska. The regulatory mechanisms used vary greatly between the states; some are
completely run by the state, while others are a mix of agencies mainly reliant on
the federal government for enforcement.

31. Garrett Epps, Constitutional Myth #7: The 10th Amendment Protects ‘States’
Rights’, THE ATLANTIC (July 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/CA68-XXSU.
32. John Echeverria, The Fate of Environmental Law in a Trump-Era Supreme
Court, SCI. AM. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/WL8S-RQ3W.
33. See Kevin Cope and Joshua Fischman, It’s hard to find a federal judge more
conservative than Brett Kavanaugh, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/QKS5ZZSY.
34. Oliver Roeder, Just How Conservative Was Neil Gorsuch’s First Term?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 25, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/6QDY-3D8A.
35. See discussion infra Section II.F.
16
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B.

California

Under current law, it is not possible to legally suction dredge mine in
California.36 In 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 670,
which banned suction dredge mining in the state until after the California
Department of Fish and Wildlife (“CDFW”) could complete a court ordered
environmental review of its permit program and existing regulations.37 In 2012, the
CDFW finished the review and concluded that lifting the ban on suction dredging
would result in significant and unavoidable environmental consequences beyond
the substantive reach of the CDFW’s regulatory power.38 On April 1, 2013, CDFW
submitted a subsequent report to the state legislature, with recommendations for
statutory amendments that would give the CDFW the necessary power to regulate
suction dredge mining.39 On October 9, 2015, S.B. 637 was signed into law, which
in part amended California’s Fish and Game Code (“FGC”) to incorporate the
statutory amendments recommended by the CDFW.40
The amended section prohibits the CDFW from issuing permits for suction
dredge mining until certain requirements are met.41 The most significant
requirement is that before permits can be issued, a regulatory scheme must be
developed that “fully mitigate[s] all identified significant environmental
impacts.”42 It is yet to be seen what a regulatory scheme looks like that would
satisfy this requirement. Judging by how extensive the CDFW’s environmental
impact report to the state was, the regulatory measures will likely be significant.43
Because it is currently impossible for the CDFW to issue a permit for suction
dredging, it is also impossible to suction dredge in California violating the FGC.
Unless expressly provided otherwise, any violation of the FGC is a criminal
misdemeanor.44 In California, unless prescribed as otherwise, a criminal
misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six months, a fine not

36. Suction Dredge Permits, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE (Oct. 19 2017, 11:08
PM), https://perma.cc/KM6Y-M9FH.
37. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
38. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(c) (Cal. 2015).
39. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(f) (Cal. 2015).
40. Cal. S.B. 637.
41. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5653.1 (2018).
42. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5653.1(b)(4) (2018).
43. Findings of Fact of the California Department of Fish and Game as a Lead
Agency Under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et
seq.) for the Suction Dredge Permitting Program (Fish & G. Code, § 5653 et seq.) as
Analyzed in the Suction Dredge Permitting Program Subsequent Environmental Impact
Report S. Comm. Hearing No. 2009112005, 2012 Legis. (Cal. 2012).
44. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 12000(a) (2018).
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exceeding $1,000, or both.45 While not as steep a penalty as other jurisdictions,46 it
is noteworthy that the possibility of jail time exists for an act that was legal with
an easily obtainable permit just ten years prior.47
It is clear from the extent of California’s ban and criminal penalties for
violation thereof, that the state considers the effects of suction dredging to be a
serious issue. This ban has sparked protest among local mining communities and
led to the Rinehart cases discussed in the previous section.48 While environmental
groups are most likely elated by the California ban, the miners’ argument is not
unreasonable. The ban has been in place for almost ten years now. If developing a
regulatory scheme to suction dredge is a priority for the CDFW, how long should
it take?
C.

Oregon

The dredging moratorium in California (2009) prompted many miners to
begin operating in Southern Oregon.49 The migration of miners prompted the
Oregon Legislature to pass S.B. 838 in 2013, which, in part, placed a moratorium
on suction dredge mining beginning January 2, 2017.50 About 5 months later on
June 14, 2017, S.B. 3 was signed into law replacing the moratorium with a
permitting system.51
Commenting on the legislation, Senator Michael Dembrow (D-Portland)
said, “[i]t is vitally important to protect endangered and threatened fish species in
our rivers and streams, but we also recognize that there is a strong mining heritage
in our state as well.”52 Senator Dembrow’s statement shows the balance of interests
at heart in Oregon. The temporary moratorium is a result of environmental concern,
but the eventual lifting of the ban and permitting system is an acknowledgment to
the people that have been suction dredging in the area for decades.
S.B. 3 codifies a permitting system which will go into effect January 1,
2018.53 Section 4(2) of the bill prohibits any suction dredging in any river or stream
that contains essential indigenous anadromous salmonid habitat.54 This designation
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (2018).
46. Illegal Mining, CHAMBER OF MINES OF S. AFR. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://perm
a.cc/Z9A9-K52N.
47. Gold Non-Rush: California Bans Dredge Mining, A. P. (Aug. 8, 2009, 5:22 PM),
https://perma.cc/ZG39-9AGY.
48. See peoplevrinehart.org (for general history of the case, and the appellants support).
49. Tracy Loew, Senate Oks Suction Dredge Mining Restrictions to Protect Fish,
STATESMAN J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/U55G-TYFR.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. S.B. 3, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017).
54. S.B. 3, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017).
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covers the vast majority of the rivers and streams within Oregon.55 Additionally,
to qualify for the permit, the inside diameter of the suction dredge hose cannot be
wider than four inches.56 Typically, a small scale suction dredge hose is between
two and ten inches.57 Finally, to the extent feasible, the operator must use his
equipment in a manner that will not harm freshwater mollusks.58 If a person
operates without a permit, or acts contrary to the requirements of the permit, they
are subject to a Class A civil violation, which has a maximum penalty of $2,000.59
Looking between the lines, this legislation appears to balance the interests
between environmentalists and miners. The ban on mining in waterways that
contain essential salmonid is a huge win for environmentalists, but the section that
allows mining near freshwater mollusks is based on a feasibility standard that is
beneficial to miners. Furthermore, while violation of the statute carries a penalty
up to $2,000, the legislature decided to make it a civil penalty rather than criminal.
In comparison to California, Oregon took a less aggressive approach to
protecting the waterways from suction dredge mining. In the time since California
placed a moratorium on suction dredging and began researching how to regulate it,
Oregon has placed a moratorium, lifted it, and set up a system of regulation that
involves civil rather than criminal penalties. Assuming California’s moratorium is
eventually lifted and a regulatory scheme is created, it will be interesting to see if
California’s more aggressive and methodical approach to setting up a scheme will
ultimately be more effective in reducing the negative impacts of suction dredging
on the environment.
D.

Idaho

While Idaho also requires a state permit to dredge, it is relatively simple to
obtain.60 Authorized under the Stream Channel Protection Act (“SCPA”), the state
provides maps of state water sources where it is permissible to operate a suction
dredge.61 The state closes most of the water ways seasonally to protect fish during
spawning season, and to prevent the introduction of invasive species.62 However,
a penalty for violating any provisions of the SCPA is only a fine ranging from $150
55. Essential Salmonid Habitat Maps, OR. ST. LIBR. DIGITAL COLLECTIONS (Oct. 11,
2018, 1:56 PM), https://perma.cc/WW79-VANN.
56. Or. S.B. 3.
57. Dave McCracken, Covering the Basics of Suction Gold Dredging, THE NEW
49ERS (Mar. 1993), https://perma.cc/TK36-F3VX.
58. Or. S.B. 3 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Brian Smith, Idaho Gold Miners Frustrated by New EPA Permit, MISSOULIAN
(Aug. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/62L9-PA3Z.
61. Recreational Mining Permits, IDAHO DEP’T OF WATER RES. (Oct. 11, 2018), https
://perma.cc/P84Y-QZAN.
62. Id.
1
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to $500.63 To put that in perspective, just to obtain a permit to suction dredge in
Idaho requires paying $250.64 Idaho relies mostly on the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) to enforce dredging under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).65
In Idaho, the EPA issued a general NPDES permit for all suction dredge
operations.66 The permit has been effective since May 2013, and was recently
reissued by the EPA.67 The permit specifies that a suction dredge cannot have a
nozzle wider than five inches, and the equipment must be less than fifteen
horsepower.68 Additionally, the mining cannot take place in any of the following
types of waterways: Nationally Protected Areas, Tribal Reservations, National
Wild and Scenic Rivers, Endangered Species Habitat Areas, Withdrawn Rivers,
State Protected Rivers, and Impaired Streams.69
Because NPDES permits get their authority from the CWA, all the penalties
for violations of the CWA are applicable here.70 The NPDES is designed to punish
commercial entities as well as private users, so the current maximum penalties are
quite high. Currently, the maximum civil penalty is $53,484 per day of violation,
and the criminal penalties for a known violation are a maximum fine of $50,000
and up to three years imprisonment for a first offense.71
However steep these potential penalties may be, it is unlikely the EPA’s
enforcement team would execute such a harsh punishment to a private individual.
EPA data from October 2013 to September 2016 showed that in Connecticut, of a
pool of twenty-nine known polluting entities, only two were fined.72 Of the twentynine polluters, thirteen of them exceeded their discharge levels by over 100
percent.73 The agency commented that while issuing fines is within their authority,
63. Recreational Mining Permits, IDAHO DEP’T OF WATER RES. (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/P84Y-QZAN.
64. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(f) (Cal. 2015).
65. Smith, supra note 59.
66. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL PERMIT NO. IDG370000, AUTHORIZATION
TO DISCHARGE UNDER THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM FOR
SMALL SUCTION DREDGE PLACER MINERS IN IDAHO (2013).
67. Id. (original permit); NPDES General Permit for Small Suction Dredge Placer
Miners in Idaho, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/9WRS-V8H9
(public notice of proposed reissuance of permit).
68. Id.
69. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY supra note 67. at 5–8.
70. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL PERMIT NO. IDG370000, AUTHORIZATION
TO DISCHARGE UNDER THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM FOR
SMALL SUCTION DREDGE PLACER MINERS IN IDAHO (2013), at 26–27.
71. Id.
72. Gary Stoller, Few Polluters Penalized for Toxic Wastewater Violations, EPA
Data Show, HARTFORD COURANT, (Apr. 7, 2017, 10:27 AM) http://www.courant.com/news/
connecticut/hc-companies-pollutants-exceed-limits-20170330-story.html.
73. Id.
169
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it is more common to issue notices of noncompliance and warnings, and that the
sheer volume of monitoring information they receive “far exceeds the capacity of
department staff.”74
Even if the EPA did have the capacity to go after individual polluters (or in
the case of suction dredging, individuals who increased water turbidity), the agency
relies entirely on self-reporting under this general permit.75 If an individual is
knowingly violating the NPDES, it seems highly unlikely they would self-report
their illegal behavior.
This system is inefficient at best, and ineffective at worst. The EPA
enforcement agency is already stretched thin and being stretched thinner.76
Additionally, the penalties under the CWA are designed to target large polluting
entities, not individuals. It would seem the EPA has little incentive to go after
individual dredge miners. If the EPA is not going to enforce the NPDES, there is
no deterrence to keep a dredge miner from not complying with the regulations.
This is not an ideal regulation scheme.
E.

Alaska

Obtaining a permit to suction dredge in Alaska is more confusing than the
other jurisdictions discussed.77 If the proposed location is on state land, the miner
only needs to purchase an over-the-counter permit and call the Alaska Department
of Natural Resources to insure she is not mining during spawning season.78
However, if the proposed mining location is on land owned by any federal agency,
the miner must obtain a separate permit from the agency.79 The process is
complicated further because the EPA has delegated regulatory authority to the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (“ADEC”), meaning any
environmental questions that would go to the EPA are now directed to the state.80

74. Gary Stoller, Few Polluters Penalized for Toxic Wastewater Violations, EPA
Data Show, HARTFORD COURANT, (Apr. 7, 2017, 10:27 AM) http://www.courant.com/news/
connecticut/hc-companies-pollutants-exceed-limits-20170330-story.html.
75. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL PERMIT NO. IDG370000, AUTHORIZATION
TO DISCHARGE UNDER THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM FOR
SMALL SUCTION DREDGE PLACER MINERS IN IDAHO (2013), at 12–13.
76. See discussion infra Section III.
77. Fact Sheet Title: Suction Dredging, ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Feb. 2012),
https://perma.cc/7JLC-DXBT.
78. Id.
79. Small Scale Mining, ALASKA DEPT’T OF FISH & GAME (Oct. 11, 2018), https://per
ma.cc/5C93-UERY.
80. Fact Sheet Title: Suction Dredging, supra note 76.
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Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers can recommend the EPA initiate legal
action for a violation of the CWA.81
One reason for this piecemeal approach to enforcing a permitting scheme in
Alaska could be the relatively small number of miners each year. For instance, in
2013, Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources only processed 207 offshore82
suction dredge permits.83 Of those, it is estimated that only sixty to eighty were
actually used.84 Another reason is that the state of Alaska is so large and has so
many water ways, it is virtually impossible to create blanket rules, and the expert
advice of the relevant agency will always be required. Regardless, this piecemeal
approach to issuing permits leads to a less consolidated enforcement agency than
the other states discussed.
F.

Summary and Key Points

Regulatory mining schemes in the United States are either almost entirely
state regulated as seen in California and Oregon, or a federally dominant hybrid of
state and federal enforcement as seen in Idaho and Alaska. The state dominated
regimes benefit from a centrally regulated agency that represents the interests of
the permitting schemes in effect. Compare these schemes with the one in Idaho,
where although there is a state permitting agency, the penalties are enforced by a
separate federal agency. The centrally regulated system seems far more efficient.
Alaska’s system is the outlier of the group. While it is easy to criticize a piecemeal
approach as being confusing and inefficient, it is also important to recognize the
complexities of the state. Alaska is many times larger than any of the other states
discussed geographically, while being the smallest in population.85 A complex
regulatory scheme may not be appropriate when local agencies are experts in the
territory they preside over.
Oregon’s scheme seems the most effective at this time for two reasons: (1) it
is centrally regulated by one agency, and (2) the scheme balances the needs of
constituencies, pleasing both environmentalists and miners. It will be interesting to
see what regulatory scheme the CDFW determines will be necessary to enforce
effective mitigation of the environmental concerns identified in California.

81. Violations and Enforcement, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/U74X-2U29.
82. In Alaska, offshore suction dredge permits refer to rivers as well as oceans and
estuaries. See supra note 77.
83. Nome Suction Dredge Study, DEP’T OF COM., COMMUNITY & ECON. DEV. 1, 11
(April 2015).
84. Nome Suction Dredge Study, supra note 81.
85. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/popclock/?intcmp=home_pop (last visited Dec. 10, 2017 2:26 PM).
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III. EPA Enforcement in the United States
This section of the note discusses whether states like Oregon and California
should continue developing their new regulatory schemes or allow the federal
government to enforce illegal suction dredge mining through agencies like the
EPA.
It is no secret the Trump administration is not a fan of federal regulation.86
During a campaign speech in October 2016, candidate Trump declared that seventy
percent of current regulations should go.87 The anti-regulatory positioning of the
campaign and early administration have reverberated down through the various
agencies, including the EPA.88
Under the Trump administration, EPA enforcement of polluters has declined
significantly.89 An analysis by the New York Times shows that during the first nine
months of the administration, the number of EPA enforcement claims was about
one third fewer than in the Obama administration, and a quarter fewer than in
George W. Bush administration over the same period.90 The New York Times also
reports that confidential internal EPA documents show that enforcement slow
down coincides with policy changes that are favorable to industry.91 The
documents further show that EPA officers no longer have the authority to
investigate certain types of pollution without direct permission from headquarters
in Washington, D.C.92 This last part is particularly troubling for the enforcement
of illegal dredge mining. In certain states, such as Idaho, the EPA is responsible
for the enforcement of illegal dredging.93 If the EPA enforcement officers are no
longer able to act on their own accord, then it is likely regulatory structures that
rely on the EPA for enforcement will continue to be under enforced.
The EPA is collecting fewer civil penalties from polluters as well.94 A report
from the Environmental Integrity Project showed that in the first six months of the
Trump presidency, about sixty percent fewer civil penalties were collected than in
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the previous three administrations.95 The EPA’s enforcement of suction dredging
through the CWA is almost completely based on the distribution of civil penalties.
If these are being excised at a slower rate, the enforcement of dredging will be less
comprehensive than it already is.
The combination of the Trump administration’s policy of anti-regulation and
weakening of the EPA’s enforcement is a clear indication that the federal
government is not the best agency to regulate suction dredge mining. California
and Oregon have showed a forward-thinking interest in protecting the environment
from suction dredging and should therefore continue to police their own policies.
The best way to regulate suction dredging in the current political environment is at
the state level, not the federal level. It is unfortunate that the responsibility of
protecting clean water, threatened species, and habitat is being marginalized at the
federal level. However, it is uplifting to see local governments adopt a burden that
is not necessarily their own, and further study the impacts and solutions to suction
dredge mining on fragile ecosystems.

IV. Global Regulatory Schemes
A.

Introduction

In contrast to the United States, most gold dredge mining conducted globally
is for livelihood, not recreation.96 The International Council on Mining and Metals
estimates that Artisanal Small Scale Mining (“ASM”) provides livelihoods for up
to 100 million people.97 Price Waterhouse Coopers estimates that ASM produces
330 metric tons of gold each year, which accounts for about twelve percent of the
global market.98 Once melted down and mixed in with legally mined gold, it is
virtually impossible to trace the gold back to the mine of origin.99 Unlike hard rock
mining, dredge mining is much more common on a small scale as it requires less
technical knowledge, and can be done relatively cheaply.100
There are significant environmental concerns associated with ASM.101 While
most ASM miners sell their gold unrefined to another party, some use an
amalgamation process where mercury is vaporized, resulting in health and

95. Valerie Volcovici, Trump EPA Lags Behind in Environmental Enforcement:
Report, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://perma.cc/7A63-P8BF.
96. U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Inst. (UNICRI), Rep. on
Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain, at 25 (May 2016).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 10.
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 25.
173

Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter 2019

environmental issues.102 Amalgamation from ASM is the second worst mercury
polluter in the world, accounting for twenty-five percent to thirty-three percent of
all mercury pollution.103 Other hazards include acid mine drainage, improper
closure of pits and mines, use of toxic chemicals and toxic effluent dumping in
forest clearings.104 The report illustrates the damage caused:
On the mining aspect, excavating the gold-bearing material has resulted
in the destruction of large tracks of land. Deforestation, soil erosion,
alluvial river damage, small dam construction, silting up of water
streams and rivers, pollution of soil and water and the dumping of
processed rock and waste are common to most artisanal and illegal
mining sites. Where the gold-bearing material contains significant
amounts of sulphides (such as pyrite), acid mine drainage further
pollutes and destroys the environment.105
In addition to the environmental concerns, there are also serious criminal
concerns.106 In some countries, armed gangs kidnap other miners and force them
to work in slave-like conditions.107 Human trafficking has been reported in South
Africa and Peru.108 Child labor has been reported in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (“DRC”), Peru, Mongolia, South Africa, and Colombia.109 In some
ASM mines, child labor makes up forty percent of the workforce, and the
International Labour Organization estimates that as many as one million children
work in ASM mines worldwide.110 Some of these children have prolonged
exposure to mercury, which can cause damage to the central nervous system,
leading to delirium and suicide.111
In response to the seriousness of the problem, countries have created
regulatory schemes to address the disparate impacts to the economy, the
environment, and human rights. The next section of this article will review the
different structures developed globally, what their motivations were for doing so,
and why they may or may not be appropriate in the United States.
102. U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Inst. (UNICRI), Rep. on
Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain, at 25 (May 2016).
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105. Id. at 36.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Gang Wars Erupt over Abandoned Mines in SA, NEWS24 (Nov. 2, 2015, 9:06
AM), https://perma.cc/WE5H-JF3H.
108. U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Inst. (UNICRI), Rep. on
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B.

South Africa

Following the adoption of a new representative South African government
in 1994, all previous mineral rights laws were reviewed to represent the inclusion
of interests of a larger population.112 This initiative led to the Mineral and
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (“MPRDA”).113 In part, the
MPRDA has new requirements that focus on, “financial resources, technical
ability, environmental concerns, social and labor, as well as health and safety
provisions.”114
The MPRDA states that its purpose is to promote advancement of economic
opportunities for historically disadvantaged people, as well as provide for the
security of prospecting and mining operations.115 The MPRDA defines an illegal
act as any action to remove minerals or attempt to conduct technical operations
without environmental authorization and the appropriate permit.116
South Africa also polices illegal mining through the Second Hand Goods Act
(“SHG”) and a sophisticated border control mechanism.117 The SHG attempts to
regulate illegal activity when the metals are changing hands with a merchant, after
it has been mined.118
1.

Environmental Authorizations

All environmental authorizations must fall within the environmental
principles described in the National Environmental Management Act
(“NEMA”).119 Similar to the United States, South Africa requires that local
branches of the national government to create environmental implementation plans
unique to their region.120 Any environmental authorization given to a private party
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(updated through 2013) (S. Afr.).
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must fall within the confines of the environmental plan.121 NEMA also requires
that any loss of biological diversity is avoided, or minimized and remedied.122 The
costs of remedying any pollution or loss of biological diversity is paid for by the
responsible party.123 Any violation of NEMA is subject to criminal proceedings
brought by the state.124 Curiously, NEMA also extends legal standing to any private
party that wishes to bring an action in the interest of the public, or in the interest of
protecting the environment.125 This mechanism of allowing a private party to bring
an environmental action is frankly astonishing. In the United States, acquiring
standing in an environmental suit is a significant hurdle.126 Allowing a private
individual to sue in the interest of protecting the environment is a powerful idea
that could have a significant impact in the field of environmental law.
Unfortunately, while the number of environmental prosecutions under NEMA has
risen recently, there is not one reported case of someone bringing a private
action.127
2.

Second Hand Goods Act

The purpose of the Second Hands Goods Act is to combat illegal trade in
stolen goods and promote ethical standards in the trade of second hand goods.128
Part of the act requires dealers that recycle controlled metals (such as gold) to
register as a recycler.129 The metals themselves must also be registered, and if a
recycler has suspicion to suspect that the metals have been acquired illegally, the
recycler is required to notify the authorities.130
3.

Enforcement

Under the MPRDA, any authorized person may make a routine inspection of
a mining operation without a warrant.131 Penalties for violating the act range from
fines of 10,000 to 500,000 rand (approximately $700 USD to $35,000 USD as of
121. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 28(5) (S. Afr.).
122. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 2(4)(a) (S. Afr.).
123. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 2(4)(p) (S. Afr.).
124. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 34(1) (S. Afr.).
125. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 32(1) (S. Afr.).
126. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992).
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November 2018), and prison sentences range from six months to ten years.132 The
most severe penalties are reserved for violations of the environmental management
provisions.133 If convicted of an offence under the Second Hand Goods Act, the
person may be subject to up to thirty days in prison and a fine.134
The laws of South Africa seem to have two main purposes: 1) to protect the
environment through steep penalties, and 2) to regulate illegal trade of metals
without harming the livelihood of the participants. This approach steers clear of
penalizing the individual ASM miners, focusing on big polluters, and the
merchants that are trading the gold.
C.

Russia

In Russia, mining of all precious metals is regulated under the Federal Law
on Precious Metals and Gemstones 1998.135 The law gives the state the authority
to regulate all transactions related to precious metals and gemstones.136 Standards
are set for each stone based on what the state determines is an appropriate amount
that should be available on the market at any given time.137 The law gives the state
the authority to set up a system of administrative courts to adjudicate any
violations.138
While the law itself gives comprehensive authority to the state, industry
insiders emphasize that violations are not strictly enforced.139 For instance,
although there are still Soviet era rules that completely prohibit the trading of gold
bars anywhere outside of a state-owned bank, it is common to buy bars outside of
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banks with little to no prosecution.140 The law itself is designed to regulate large
scale operations, not the activities of ASM miners.141
In Southern Siberia, there is little to no government enforcement of suction
dredge mining.142 Local environmentalists are taking the initiative to combat the
mining by documenting where it is happening and putting together a case for local
prosecutors.143 The fact that local environmentalists are putting together cases
outside of the government demonstrates a tremendous lack of enforcement. These
efforts may be in vain, as the current politics of Russia are opposed to
environmental enforcement.144 It seems that without the political will, the mining
regulations that do exist in Russia are toothless.
Currently, the biggest attractor for ASM miners is in Baltic Sea amber, not
gold.145 It is popular in the region as jobs are hard to come by, and digging for the
amber is much more lucrative than the jobs that do exist.146 The Baltic Sea region
is rife with reports of corrupt officials and police that look the other way when
finding illegal amber mining.147 Officials are suspected of being paid by local crime
syndicates to allow the activity to continue.148 The penalties are also relatively
light, resulting in a small fine and confiscation of equipment.149 The lack of
government enforcement in both the Baltic Sea regions and Southern Siberia
demonstrate a gap in Russia’s regulatory structure. An outdated regulatory scheme
that does not seem concerned with ASM miners is ineffective and undesirable.
D.

Colombia and Other South American Countries

In Colombia, ninety percent of all mines are unlicensed.150 Armed militia
groups have found their way into the trade, and have had a “positive and
significant” effect on murder rates in the areas in which they operate.151 A common
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issue is the displacement of indigenous peoples from their lands.152 In 2012 alone,
up to eighty people of the Yanomami tribe were reported to have been killed while
resisting displacement by local illegal miners in Venezuela.153
The environmental impacts have also been severe: A research team found
that in one region, some thirty to forty tons of mercury are poured into local rivers
each year.154 Seventy-eight percent of the local population had a mercury
concentration three times the average.155 In the region of Choco more than 19,000
hectares of the rainforest have been destroyed from local mining.156
The government responded by creating a 500-man militarized unit.157 The
main tactics include arresting those that are mining and destroying their
equipment.158 A local think-tank believes the strategy is having little to no effect,
and the illegal mining and environmental devastation will continue virtually
unchecked.159
A militarized force similar to the one in Colombia is also active in Peru.160
Experts say the environmental damage done by illegal mining in Peru is far more
destructive than what is done by the mining companies.161 In less than a year, the
Tambopata reserve went from being virtually untouched, to all but destroyed by
illegal mining.162 The government has responded with military raids, attempting to
coerce miners to leave the illegal mining camps by force.163 But the marines
involved in the raids are ill equipped, and critics are skeptical of their actual
effect.164
A study from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
claims that the increased involvement of criminal syndicates in illegal gold mining
is displacing local populations, and facilitating child labor and sexual
exploitation.165 The study found illegal activities in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
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Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.166 Such far-reaching
criminal activity explains why Colombia, Peru, and other Latin American countries
resort to using military force.
The environmental devastation and violence from illegal mining in South
America is unmatched in the other jurisdictions discussed. It is difficult to criticize
a regulatory scheme when there are factors present that make administrative
remedies seem almost comical. The governments have initiated military operations
to curve the devastation, and they are having little impact.167 If any regulatory
scheme is to be effective, the situation needs to be under government control first.
It is inappropriate to criticize the activities of these governments in a situation that
is as violent and complex as the one in South America.
E.

Comparing Global Regulatory Schemes in the United States

Based on cursory research, global regulatory schemes seem to fall into three
categories: (1) light civil enforcement, as seen in South Africa; (2) codified, but
not enforced regulation, as seen in the Russian Federation; and (3) heavy
militarized enforcement, as seen in Colombia.
In South Africa, the most severe penalties are saved for environmental
infractions, while laws that regulate small transactions, such as the Second Hand
Goods Act, have relatively small penalties. One of the fundamental principles of
the MPRDA is to “substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for
historically disadvantaged persons.”168 The principles in the act demonstrate a
commitment to helping people mine sustainably while promoting their economic
and social welfare.169
Compare the fundamental principles of the MPRDA with the militarized
enforcement of Colombia, and it becomes quickly apparent how important the
driving factors for the regulation are. In all three of the countries reviewed, the
driving force for the mining is livelihood, not recreation, as seen in the United
States. The limited resources and high cost of living make it impractical to rely on
suction dredge mining as a means of living within the United States. Because the
driving force of suction dredging in the United States is recreation, the regulatory
laws and penalties should be tailored to fit those interests and not ones based on
livelihood.
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A large part of the reason the violence around mining exists in Colombia is
because of a lack of other economic opportunity.170 When the issue at hand is
survival, the laws and rules of the region become less important to the individual
actor. In these situations, government and military intervention may be appropriate.
However, when the driving force behind the illegal activity is recreation, not
survival, these drastic measures are excessive and inefficient.
For these reasons, this paper argues that if the United States is to look to
another country’s regulatory scheme for inspiration it should mirror the MPRDA
of South Africa. The purpose should be to efficiently manage the industry of ASM,
while heavily penalizing any damage to the environment. Heavy environmental
penalties that are well enforced deter recreational miners from engaging in illegal
behavior while still promoting the activity itself. If miners in the United States are
not relying on gold for their livelihood, the moral question shifts from hurting a
person’s ability to sustain themselves, to protecting the natural world from
unnecessary destruction. Criminal penalties and militarization to enforce suction
dredge mining in the United States are not appropriate, but what is fitting is
deterrence through steep environmental penalties.

V.

Conclusion

In conclusion, states such as California and Oregon should continue to
develop their own suction dredging regulatory programs and not rely on the federal
government for enforcement. California and Oregon should also continue to study
the impacts that suction dredge mining has on local ecosystems, and carefully
monitor environmental impacts.
If the Court decides to hear a case concerning state regulation of suction
dredge mining, it will be interesting to see if they decide to pick up the “commercial
impracticability” standard that was not addressed by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Rinehart.171 There is also the question of whether the conservative
members of the Supreme Court will recognize the states’ rights to regulate suction
dredging under the Tenth Amendment, or rule against regulation as an intrusion
into federal power.
After reviewing the global regulatory schemes found in Part IV of this paper,
the United States should adopt the heavy environmental fines found in South
Africa. Steep environmental penalties send the message that it is okay to participate
in regulated activity, but operating in a way that harms the environment is not
acceptable. Severe criminal penalties and military intervention are not appropriate
in the United States because the activity here is recreational in nature.
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It is necessary to develop enforced suction dredging regulatory programs in
the United States because the environmental impact of unregulated dredging is
simply unacceptable. If suction dredge mining continues to grow in popularity and
the activity is unchecked, it could have devastating impacts on threatened and
endangered fish and their habitats. Legislatures should take a hard look at the
environments effected by these activities and look to California and Oregon as
examples for creating enforced, robust, regulatory programs.
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